WASHINGTON — The FederalAviation Administration received repeated warnings in the months prior to Sept.11, 2001, about al-Qaida and its desire to attack airlines, according to apreviously undisclosed report by the commission that investigated the terrorattacks.
The report by the 9/11commission that investigated the suicide airliner attacks on the World TradeCenter and the Pentagon detailed52 such warnings given to FAA leaders from April to Sept. 10, 2001, about theradical Islamic terrorist group and its leader, Osama bin Laden .
The commission report, writtenlast August, said five security warnings mentioned al-Qaida’s training forhijackings and two reports concerned suicide operations not connected toaviation. However, none of the warnings pinpointed what would happen on Sept.11.
FAA spokeswoman Laura Brown saidthe agency received intelligence from other agencies, which it passed on toairlines and airports.
But, she said, “We had nospecific information about means or methods that would have enabled us totailor any countermeasures.”
Brown also said the FAA was inthe process of tightening security at the time of the attacks.
“We were spending $100 million ayear to deploy explosive detection equipment at the airports,” she said. Theagency was also close to issuing a regulation that would have set higherstandards for screeners and, for the first time, give it direct control overthe screening work force.
Al Felzenberg, former spokesmanfor the 9/11 commission, which went out of business last summer, said thegovernment had not completed a review of the 120-page report fordeclassification purposes until recently.
The unclassified version, first reported by The New YorkTimes, was made available by the National Archives Thursday.
According to the report:
— Aviation officials were”lulled into a false sense of security” and “intelligence that indicated a realand growing threat leading up to 9/ll did not stimulate significant increasesin security procedures.”
— Of the FAA’s 105 dailyintelligence summaries between April 1, 2001 and Sept. 10, 2001, 52 mentionedOsama bin Laden, al Qaida, or both, “mostly in regard to overseas threats.”
— It notes that the FAA didnot expand the use of in-flight air marshals or tighten airport screening forweapons. It said FAA officials were more concerned with reducing airlinecongestion, lessening delays and easing air carriers’ financial problems thanthwarting a terrorist attack.
— A proposed rule to improvepassenger screening and other security measures ordered by Congress in 1996 hadbeen held up by the Office of Management and Budget and was still not in effectwhen the attacks occurred, according to the FAA.
— Information in this reportwas available to members of the 9/11 commission when they issued their public reportlast summer. That report itself contained criticisms of FAA operations.
